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Forum on Emerging Infectious Diseases: The Military’s Role Under the International Health 
Regulations (2005), held in September 2010 in St. Petersburg, Russia, and sponsored by the 
U.S. Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center, the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences, 
and the International Committee of Military Medicine. 
Abstract
Security, economic, development, and humanitarian threats created by infectious diseases 
have heightened the importance of military forces to national and global public health 
responses. This article explores the increasing need for military involvement in public 
and global health surveillance and response to infectious disease threats, and focuses on 
how military forces can more effectively support implementation of the World Health 
Organization’s International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR (2005)). The article explains 
the major changes made in negotiations that produced the IHR (2005) and the importance 
of these changes to military-to-military activities and civilian-military cooperation. It 
identifies five areas in which military forces can advance implementation of the IHR (2005) 
—compliance, coherence, coordination, cooperation, and capacity — and includes examples 
from various countries illustrating how militaries can contribute to progress on IHR (2005) 
implementation. It recommends additional actions from military forces, including a proposal 
for a Global Military Working Group on the Implementation of the IHR (2005) led by the 
International Committee on Military Medicine.
Keywords: bioterrorism, capacity building, civilian-military cooperation, Department of 
Defense, emerging infectious diseases, global health, global health security, implementation, 
International Health Regulations (2005), military forces, military-to-military cooperation, 
public health, surveillance, World Health Organization
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Introduction
The history of humanity’s struggle with infectious diseases records the impact 
of military forces on the emergence, spread, and control of such diseases. This military 
involvement has included spreading pathogens through war, mitigating the damage 
infections have inflicted on fighting forces, and contributing to the protection of general 
population health. The complexity of the military’s role in public health nationally and 
globally has increased in the past 10 to 15 years because of changes in the threats posed 
by infectious diseases. With such diseases increasingly manifesting as security, economic, 
development, and humanitarian concerns, military forces have faced new demands on their 
capabilities to support public health within and beyond the territories they protect.
One important development in this new relationship between the military and 
global health is the International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR (2005)), adopted by the 
World Health Organization (WHO) (WHO, 2008). Developed to advance global health 
security (WHO, 2010a), the IHR (2005) radically changed the international law applicable 
to the international spread of disease (Fidler, 2005). Although most attention generated 
by the IHR (2005) has focused on civilian public health, the IHR (2005) are important to 
militaries. Understanding the challenges and opportunities defense establishments face from 
the IHR (2005) is important to support the regulations and manage the increasing health 
demands on militaries. This article examines the IHR (2005)’s implications for military 
forces and explores strategies for militaries to advance the IHR (2005) as an instrument of 
global health security.
Military Forces and Global Health: New Context, New Rules
New Context: The Military and Global Health
Military forces have long been concerned about population health in two contexts. 
First, militaries require healthy personnel to undertake their missions. Historically, armies 
endured severe morbidity and mortality from infectious diseases during armed conflict. This 
attrition led to improvements in military hygiene, sanitation, and treatment of wounds. 
Starting in the twentieth century, the task of protecting troops also addressed the potential 
use of biological weapons in warfare. The laws of war also placed increasing demands on 
military forces concerning the health of enemy combatants, prisoners of war, and civilians in 
war zones or under military occupation. These rules included, among others, the prohibition 
on weapons that cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering (Henckaerts & Doswald-
Beck, 2005), and the duty of an occupying military to maintain health services in occupied 
territory (Geneva Convention (IV), 1949, Article 56). 
These contexts are limited to the primary security functions of military forces. 
However, efforts to mitigate health threats to troops and reduce adverse health consequences 
of military operations have produced some “spill over” benefits for general population 
health. Knowledge gained and research undertaken by military personnel have informed 
interventions for protecting civilians, such as contributions the U.S. military made to malaria 
control and treatment (Ockenhouse, Magill, Smith, & Milhous, 2005). 
The relationship between military forces and public and global health changed in 
the 1990s, producing an expanded role for military organizations, especially with respect 
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to supporting the civilian sector. This context emerged in the wake of two crises. The first 
involved the vulnerability of countries to the emergence and re-emergence of naturally 
occurring infectious diseases. For military forces, emerging infectious diseases (EIDs) 
presented new threats to the old concern about the health of military personnel, as evidenced 
by concerns about the impact HIV and AIDS could have on armed forces in Africa 
(Feldbaum, Lee, & Patel, 2006).
However, political responses that characterized EIDs as threats to national security, 
foreign policy, and development interests affected the military’s involvement in national and 
global public health. In the United States, President Bill Clinton expanded the Department 
of Defense’s mission “to include supporting global surveillance, training, research, and 
response to emerging infectious disease threats” (White House, 1996). This new task made 
the Department of Defense important to the larger U.S. effort to “[e]stablish a global 
infectious disease surveillance and response system” that would protect U.S. citizens from 
naturally occurring infectious diseases (White House, 1996). Later, national strategies to 
address infectious disease threats, such as pandemic influenza, assigned roles to the military 
(U.S Homeland Security Council, 2006; U.S. Department of Defense, 2006). The message 
behind these developments was that it was necessary to utilize defense assets in integrated 
“whole of government” efforts to strengthen surveillance and response, given the nature and 
danger of the threat.
The second crisis involved bioweapons and bioterrorism. Revelations in the early 
1990s about the former Soviet Union’s and Iraq’s bioweapons programs stimulated efforts 
to address bioweapons proliferation by states. This concern connected with long-standing 
military needs to protect troops from bioweapons in armed conflict. However, fears about 
bioterrorism added a new element. Military capabilities in disease surveillance and biodefense 
research and development were brought to bear on bioterrorism through surveillance of 
suspicious events and development of detection systems and countermeasures. These efforts 
supported actions being taken in the civilian sector to prevent, protect against, and respond 
to bioterrorist attacks.
What unified developments across these crises was the need for civilian and military 
capabilities to work together against EIDs and bioterrorism for the protection of the health 
of military personnel and the general public. This objective required conceptual and policy 
shifts. Civilian public health, long starved of resources in many countries, had to accept the 
need to draw on military capabilities in addressing EIDs. National security communities 
had to understand that responding to a bioterrorist attack required robust civilian health 
systems. The lines demarcating military and civilian realms began to blur, creating the need 
to integrate civilian and military efforts against pathogenic threats.
Similar conclusions emerged from other health activities undertaken by military 
forces. The use of military capabilities for medical treatment and public health in responding 
to humanitarian disasters (WHO, 2005, ¶¶ 46-49), winning “hearts and minds” in 
counterinsurgency operations (Feldbaum & Michaud, 2010), and delivering health assistance 
to developing countries through hospital ships (O’Brien, 2009) raised the profile of military 
forces in global health. These activities generated controversy because they highlighted 
inadequate civilian capacities and created concerns about the militarization of development 
and humanitarian assistance. Nevertheless, these activities deepened the importance of 
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military capabilities and their integration into civilian efforts to strengthen public health 
nationally and globally. 
New Rules: Towards the IHR (2005)
At the same time the relationship between the military and global health was 
transforming, WHO embarked on revising the International Health Regulations (1969) 
(IHR (1969)) (WHO, 1983). This process had to address the threats from EIDs and 
bioterrorism that were altering the military-global health interface. Thus, crafting new 
rules for international disease at a time when the military’s role in this realm was expanding 
constituted an important development for armed forces.
The IHR (1969) and predecessor treaties did not affect military forces significantly. 
The regime that developed from the nineteenth century through the IHR (1969) focused 
on infectious diseases, the spread of which countries associated with international trade and 
travel. The rules applied to only a few diseases, with only cholera, plague, and yellow fever 
remaining constant from the first international sanitary conference in 1851 through the 
IHR (1969). The rules were geared more toward protecting trade than strengthening public 
health. The regime’s basic bargain involved two obligations: countries suffering outbreaks of 
specified diseases agreed to report such outbreaks, and other countries agreed to apply only 
scientifically justified responses to the trade and travel coming from the outbreak country. 
Governments did not view this regime as important to foreign policy, national security, or 
development interests. The rules left the matter of bioweapons to the security community to 
handle through arms control.
The regime’s narrow scope had limited impact on civilian and military health 
efforts. Civilian officials and military forces had more diseases to worry about than cholera, 
plague, and yellow fever. During the 1960s and 1970s, experts questioned the traditional 
regime’s approach in light of changes in transportation technologies and the need to address 
diseases not covered by the rules (Dorolle, 1969; Velimirovic, 1976). Violations by countries 
(e.g., failure to report outbreaks and application of unjustified trade restrictions) undermined 
the regime’s credibility (Fidler, 1999). 
EIDs and bioterrorism again exposed the inadequacy of the traditional rules and 
highlighted the need for a strategy that required a broader scope of application, imposed 
more demanding obligations, and produced more surveillance and response capacities. With 
the military’s role in global health increasing, new rules with wider application, tougher 
duties, and requirements for more capacity promised to implicate defense organizations 
more than the traditional regime. From the military’s perspective, the IHR (2005)’s 
adoption reflected the transformed global health context in which the military operated, and 
underscored the new responsibilities of military forces in this context.
International Health Regulations (2005): Key Changes
The IHR (2005) contain rules never before seen in efforts to control the 
international spread of disease. The differences between the IHR (2005) and the IHR 
(1969) are too many to analyze here, so this paper focuses on key revisions, which make 
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the IHR (2005) “one of the most radical and far-reaching changes to international law on 
public health since the beginning of international health cooperation in the mid-nineteenth 
century” (Fidler, 2005, p. 326). The IHR (2005) contain other provisions that have 
undergone less radical, but still important, changes. Understanding these transformations 
and changes is a necessary prelude to examining their implications for militaries. 
Expanded Scope of the IHR (2005)
The IHR (2005) expand the scope of the rules in terms of their purpose, 
application, obligations, participation, and WHO’s authority. The IHR (2005)’s purpose 
resembles that of the IHR (1969) in aiming to control the international spread of disease 
while avoiding unnecessary interference with trade and travel (Article 2). However, the new 
regulations focus more on protecting population health than trade interests. The change is 
clear in the new scope of disease coverage, which abandons the disease-specific approach and 
adopts a strategy to identify existing and unknown disease threats. The IHR (2005) require 
States Parties to notify WHO of all disease events that might constitute a public health 
emergency of international concern (PHEIC) (Article 6 and Annex 2) — an expansion of 
the obligations of States Parties in notifying disease outbreaks. 
The IHR (2005) also expand the scope of application by including accidental and 
intentional releases of biological, chemical, and radiological agents (Articles 1, 6, and 7). 
This change reflects the understanding that health harms are not limited to EIDs but can 
include biological, chemical, and radiological terrorism and accidental releases of health-
harming substances. Including these dangers is consistent with an “all hazards” approach, 
which also expands the scope of the obligations. 
The IHR (2005) also expand WHO’s scope of participation and authority. As 
examined further below, the IHR (2005) allow WHO to use information from non-
governmental sources (Articles 9 and 10) — powers neither the IHR (1969) nor any prior 
version of these rules permitted. This rule makes non-governmental actors participants 
in global surveillance and empowers WHO to assess information received from outside 
governmental channels. In another unprecedented move, the IHR (2005) increase WHO’s 
authority by empowering the WHO Director-General to declare a PHEIC and issue 
temporary recommendations on actions States Parties should take in response to a declared 
PHEIC (Articles 12 and 15).
Core Capacities for Surveillance and Response
The IHR (2005) require States Parties to develop and maintain core capacities 
for surveillance and response (Articles 5, 13, and Annex 1). The old rules only imposed 
requirements for public health capabilities at designated points of entry and exit (e.g., 
adequate sanitation at sea ports). The new rules include such requirements (Annex 1), 
but transcend them in imposing obligations on developing core surveillance and response 
capacities throughout their territories. These obligations seek to ensure that countries 
have baseline capabilities to identify and respond to disease events and comply with the 
IHR (2005). States Parties have to develop these core capacities by 2012, with options for 
extensions until 2016 (Articles 5 and 13).
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Use of Non-Governmental Sources of Information
The IHR (2005) empower WHO to collect, analyze, and verify information received 
from non-governmental sources (Articles 9 and 10). This authority reflects the conclusion that 
any regime on the international spread of disease limited to government-provided information 
would fail, as the IHR (1969) had. New information technologies created opportunities for 
national and international health agencies to obtain information from more sources about 
disease events. Permitting WHO to use such information and requiring States Parties to 
respond to WHO verification requests transform the notification dynamic by (1) reducing 
incentives governments have to cover up disease events for fear of economic or political 
repercussions; and (2) increasing incentives for countries to cooperate with WHO to address 
identified problems. WHO statistics demonstrate that non-governmental actors constitute a 
significant source of information (Institute of Medicine, 2009). 
WHO Director-General’s Power to Declare a PHEIC and Issue 
Temporary Recommendations
The IHR (2005) authorize the WHO Director-General to declare that a disease 
event constitutes a PHEIC (Article 12), and to issue temporary recommendations on how 
States Parties should respond (Article 15). Nothing like these authorities existed in previous 
regimes. The WHO Director-General first exercised these powers in declaring pandemic 
influenza A (H1N1) a PHEIC in April 2009, and issuing temporary recommendations 
on responding to the threat. The authority to declare a PHEIC and issue temporary 
recommendations represents the potential for the WHO Director-General to exercise 
political and economic power vis-à-vis governments. Combined with the ability to collect, 
use, and verify information from non-governmental sources, the declaration and temporary 
recommendation powers create constraints on sovereignty in the name of global health. 
Respect for Human Rights
The IHR (2005) state that their implementation “shall be with full respect for 
the dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms of persons” (Article 3.1). The IHR 
(2005) contain other provisions (Articles 23.2-23.5, 31.1, 31.2, 32, 42, 43.2, and 45.1-
45.3) relevant to protecting the human rights of persons subject to health measures within 
the scope of the regulations (Plotkin, 2007). The inclusion of human rights principles 
underscores how the IHR (2005) have departed from the past primary concern about 
balancing trade and public health. It also reflects increased attention on human rights created 
by policy responses to EIDs and bioterrorism. Actions taken by some governments during 
the H1N1 pandemic, such as isolation and quarantine of travelers, came under human rights 
scrutiny through the IHR (2005)’s application.
National IHR Focal Points
The IHR (2005) seek to improve communications by requiring each government to 
establish a National IHR Focal Point with the responsibility of implementing the regulations 
(Article 4). This approach aims to streamline and make more effective communication 
channels within and among national governments and WHO, which also must establish 
IHR Contact Points. Experience to date, including with H1N1, indicates that the National 
IHR Focal Points have improved information flows and contributed to the success achieved 
so far (Katz, 2009). 
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Other Changes
The IHR (2005) contain other important, if less radical, changes that deserve 
mention. With abandonment of the disease-specific approach, the new regulations could 
not contain maximum measures limiting States Parties’ responses to disease events. Instead, 
the IHR (2005) require that measures applied to trade and travelers have public health and 
scientific justifications. For measures that seek greater protection than WHO recommends, 
the State Party has to consider scientific principles, evidence, and advice from WHO (Article 
43.2). For more protective measures that significantly interfere with trade and travel, the 
State Party must provide WHO with the public health rationale and scientific information 
supporting the measures (Article 43.3). During the H1N1 pandemic, some countries 
applied measures, such as import bans on pork, which had no public health or scientific 
justification. WHO also modified technical aspects of the regulations, such as replacing the 
old de-ratting certificate for ships with the ship sanitation control certificate (Annex 3) and 
the old international certificate of vaccination or revaccination against yellow fever with the 
model international certificate of vaccination or prophylaxis (Annex 6). 
International Health Regulations (2005) and Military Forces
In keeping with the expanded role of military forces in global health, the IHR 
(2005)’s implications for defense establishments are significant (Johns et al., 2010). Given 
diversity among militaries, no single blueprint for handling the IHR (2005) is possible. 
However, each military should review the IHR (2005) against its missions and resources. 
Such reviews could keep in mind five useful categories: compliance, coherence, coordination, 
cooperation, and capacity. Table 1 provides examples of military strategies under each 
category and of national efforts to implement such strategies.
Compliance
The IHR (2005) contain binding international legal obligations. The IHR (2005) 
do not exempt military forces, dilute rules for such forces, or provide national security 
exceptions. The only IHR (2005) provision that specifically mentions “Armed Forces” 
permits, under certain conditions, active members of such forces to have a document 
different from but equivalent to the International Certificate of Vaccination and Prophylaxis 
(Annex 6). The IHR (2005)’s principle of achieving “universal application for protection of 
all people of the world” underscores this point (Article 3). The extent of military compliance 
needed will depend on how governments use militaries for functions affected by the IHR 
(2005). For example, some militaries might control points of entry and exit, and, depending 
on the functions of the military’s border control responsibilities, the IHR (2005) could apply 
to military personnel actions. Other militaries might have no role in border control but be 
involved in disease monitoring among troops at home and overseas that the IHR (2005) 
affect through provisions on surveillance and notification of disease events. 
Controversy in this context arose concerning an understanding the United States 
issued upon accepting the new regulations. The IHR (2005) require States Parties, as far 
as practicable, to inform WHO of public health risks identified outside their territories 
that might cause international disease spread (Article 9.2). The United States accepted this 
obligation with the understanding that it is impractical to notify these risks when a notification 
“would undermine the ability of the U.S. Armed Forces to operate effectively in pursuit of 
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U.S. national security interests” (Appendix 1). The concern is that notifying such risks in a 
country hosting U.S. military forces could harm the forces’ ability to fulfill their mission by 
creating problems with the host government, especially if that government has failed to notify 
WHO of the risk, as required under the IHR (2005). Iran criticized the U.S. understanding, 
arguing that it dilutes U.S. obligations by placing its interests above the IHR (2005)’s universal 
application and exempting U.S. armed forces from the regulations (Appendix 1). 
The merits of the U.S. and Iranian positions could be debated, but, as a practical 
matter, the key to mitigating the potential tension created by Article 9.2 is effective 
cooperation about the IHR (2005) between the government providing military forces and the 
government hosting them (Johns et al., 2010). Such cooperation can increase the incentives a 
host government has to communicate with WHO about public health risks in its territory that 
might cause international disease spread, reducing the need for Article 9.2 to cause friction. 
This article returns to the importance of cooperation on the IHR (2005) below. 
Coherence
For a State Party to comply with the IHR (2005), all governmental elements must 
be consistent in their implementation of the regulations. The military plays an important 
part in achieving coherence among national agencies with responsibilities for activities 
affected by the IHR (2005) (WHO, 2007). For most countries, control over military forces 
is not decentralized, removing coherence challenges created by federal systems that locate 
civilian public health powers at the state or provincial level. Achieving coherence requires 
vetting relevant legislation, regulations, instructions, and operating practices in civilian and 
military sectors and making changes to ensure both sectors apply the same or equivalent rules 
and strategies. Coherence issues could arise in a number of IHR (2005) contexts, including 
use of defined terms, application of the decision instrument that guides notification 
of disease events, recognition of technical requirements (e.g., the new ship sanitation 
certificate), and respect for human rights principles.
Coordination
Coherence is necessary but not sufficient to advance “whole of government” 
implementation of the IHR (2005). Also important is coordination among governmental 
agencies tasked with responsibilities relevant to the IHR (2005) (WHO, 2010b). Branches 
of the military must work together and communicate in managing the surveillance, response, 
and other obligations in the IHR (2005), as must military and civilian agencies. Effective 
intra-military and civilian-military coordination have been problematic in other contexts, 
including intelligence sharing, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, development efforts, 
and disaster relief. Thus, the coordination challenge facing the military in implementation of 
the IHR (2005) should not be underestimated. 
The obligation to establish an IHR National Focal Point has helped facilitate better 
communication and coordination, but intra-military and civilian-military coordination and 
communication involve complex political, chain-of-command, information sharing, and 
technical issues that should be addressed proactively and not primarily as part of post-crisis 
“lessons learned.” Including “stress tests” for intra-military and civilian-military coordination 
capabilities in simulations and “table top” exercises involving EID or bioterrorism threats 
could facilitate identifying and managing coordination problems.
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Cooperation
Military forces also have a role in IHR (2005) implementation by including the 
IHR (2005) in military-to-military and civilian-military cooperation. Many countries 
participate in military-to-military programs that involve technical assistance, training, and 
joint military exercises. Such programs can incorporate more health-related issues, including 
the military’s role in IHR (2005) implementation. For example, the Global Health and 
Security Working Group of the Center for Strategic and International Affairs has proposed 
that the U.S. government “create a specific health theme for DOD’s military-to-military 
activities,” (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2010) and cooperation on the 
IHR (2005) could form part of such a health focus. Similarly, potential exists to address 
the IHR (2005) in ventures between military forces and civilian agencies in other countries 
(International Military Forum on Emerging Infectious Diseases, 2010). Such military-to-
military and civilian-military cooperation would help countries fulfill their obligation under 
the IHR (2005) to collaborate on implementation of the regulations (Article 44.1).
Capacity
Militaries in developed and developing countries have a role to play in the capacity 
building needed to implement the IHR (2005) (International Military Forum on Emerging 
Infectious Diseases, 2010). As noted earlier, the IHR (2005) require States Parties to develop 
and maintain core capacities for surveillance and response, and, as a nearly universally 
accepted instrument, all countries have responsibilities for capacity building. One of the 
biggest concerns about the IHR (2005)’s future remains the inadequacy of these capacities in 
many countries and the insufficient efforts being mounted to address this problem (Wilson, 
Brownstein, & Fidler, 2010). Military forces alone will not solve this challenge, but they can 
contribute by:
a. Strengthening the military’s own capacities in disease surveillance and response;
b. Supporting civilian efforts at home and abroad to build detection and  
intervention capacities;
c. Supplementing civilian capacity in contexts where such capacity is inadequate or 
ineffective because of insecure conditions;
d. Helping foreign militaries build their IHR (2005)-relevant capacities; and 
e. Assisting development agencies build capabilities in developing and  
least-developed countries. 
Although important, military involvement with capacity building faces challenges. 
Not all militaries have the resources and personnel to scale up capacity-building activities, 
and resources for such activities are increasingly difficult to access because of fiscal problems 
in many nations. Increasing military contributions should not come at the expense of 
building civilian capacity and increasing civilian-led capacity-building endeavors. Further, 
military efforts need to avoid building capacity that is mainly relevant to the health and 
security interests of the country providing assistance, meaning that the capacity must reflect 
not only the IHR (2005)’s demands but also the recipient country’s public health challenges. 
Military participation in capacity building with foreign civilian counterparts also has to 
Special Reports
126     Volume I, No. 1, 2011                                               Journal of Healthcare, Science and the Humanities 
be sensitive to concerns in the civilian and non-governmental communities about greater 
military involvement in public health (Table 1). 
Table 1. Summary Table of IHR (2005) Implementation Objectives and Potential Military 
Strategies
Strategy for Military Forces National Examples
IHR (2005) Implementation Objective: Compliance
Comprehensively review 
military missions and 
existing law, regulations, 
instructions, and operating 
procedures against 
requirements of the IHR 
(2005)
• Czech Republic Ministry of Defense legal review on IHR (2005) 
compliance (International Military Forum on Emerging Infectious 
Diseases, 2010)
• U.S. Department of Defense strategy for compliance with the IHR 
(2005), which, among other things, amended the U.S. Cooperative 
Biological Threat Reduction program to promote IHR (2005) 
compliance (Weber, 2010)
IHR (2005) Implementation Objective: Coherence
Ensure military 
understanding, 
interpretation, and 
application of IHR (2005) is 
identical or equivalent within 
all military branches and 
with those civilian agencies
• Thai military efforts to work with and support the Thai Ministry 
of Public Health on IHR (2005) implementation and compliance 
(International Military Forum on Emerging Infectious Diseases, 2010)
• Disease reporting within branches of military forces and 
between the military and civilian health agencies in Peru through 
development of military-based electronic disease surveillance 
system based on IHR (2005) requirements (Chretien et al., 2007)
• Integration of the decision instrument in Annex 2 of the IHR 
(2005) into U.S. Department of Defense management of public 
health emergencies (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010)
IHR (2005) Implementation Objective: Coordination
Establish effective 
coordination mechanisms 
within defense 
establishments and with 
civilian partners to facilitate 
IHR (2005) implementation
• Expanding an inter-ministerial group on preparing Brazil’s 
responses to emerging infectious diseases to include the Brazilian 
military (International Military Forum on Emerging Infectious 
Diseases, 2010)
• Inclusion of the military in South Africa’s Provincial Outbreak and 
Response Teams to coordinate disease surveillance and responses 
consistent with the IHR (2005) (International Military Forum on 
Emerging Infectious Diseases, 2010)
• Military reporting of disease information in remote areas on the 
Thai/Myanmar and Thai/Cambodian borders to the Thai Ministry of 
Public Health (International Military Forum on Emerging Infectious 
Diseases, 2010)
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IHR (2005) Implementation Objective: Compliance
Include IHR (2005) 
implementation issues in 
health aspects of overseas 
military-to-military activities 
and in military assistance to 
foreign civilian agencies
• Czech Republic bilateral (e.g., with Poland) and multilateral (e.g., 
with NATO) military-to-military cooperation on disease surveillance 
(International Military Forum on Emerging Infectious Diseases, 2010)
• Peruvian military-to-military cooperation with Ecuador and 
military-to-civilian cooperation with Panama concerning electronic 
disease surveillance (International Military Forum on Emerging 
Infectious Diseases, 2010)
• Enhancement of civilian-military cooperation on pandemic 
influenza at U.S. Africa Command meeting for Asian and African 
countries (Skinner, 2009)
IHR (2005) Implementation Objective: Capacity
Support surveillance and 
response capacity building 
in foreign countries in both 
the military and civilian 
sectors
• Thai military efforts to support malaria control capacities in 
Myanmar and Cambodia (International Military Forum on Emerging 
Infectious Diseases, 2010)
• Capacity-building assistance on malaria control provided by the 
Institute of Tropical Medicine of the French Army Health Corps to 
the Vietnamese Army Health Corps (Chretien et al., 2007)
Global Military Working Group on Implementation of the IHR (2005)
Given the complexity of issues that arise for military forces under the IHR 
(2005), a working group of representatives of different military forces around the world 
that identifies difficulties militaries have with IHR (2005) compliance, disseminates best 
practices for implementation, generates opportunities for military-to-military cooperation, 
and collaborates with WHO could be valuable. The International Committee on Military 
Medicine, which is in official relations with WHO, could sponsor such a working group. 
Formation of this working group could be an outcome of the International Military Forum 
on Emerging Infectious Diseases on the military’s role under the IHR (2005) held in St. 
Petersburg in September 2010.
Conclusion
Elevating the IHR (2005) within the transformed responsibilities militaries have 
in global health requires understanding these regulations and the need for military forces to 
leverage their capabilities for IHR (2005) implementation. Moving in this direction does 
not mean the militarization of the IHR (2005) but acceptance that EIDs and bioterrorism 
warrant effective “whole of government” responses. In the global health realm, the main 
military mission is to support and supplement civilian-led actions. To the extent that 
militaries have not identified how they can shoulder their burden of implementing the IHR 
(2005), this mission will not be accomplished. 
Strategy for Military Forces National Examples
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